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Sammendrag 
Etter pensjonsreformen i 2011 er uttak av pensjon og avgang fra arbeidsstyrken i stor grad frikoplet: 
Uttak av alderspensjon fra folketrygden kan startes når som helst mellom alder 62 og 75, hvor årlige 
ytelser justeres i henhold til gjennomsnittlig forventet gjenstående levetid ved uttakstidspunktet. 
Personer som lever kortere enn gjennomsnittet vil, alt annet likt, tjene på å ta ut alderspensjon så tidlig 
som mulig. Hovedformålet med denne artikkelen er å besvare følgende spørsmål: Hvordan og i 
hvilken grad er uttak av alderspensjon fra folketrygden forbundet med individuelle variasjoner i 
forventet levealder? Vi tilnærmer oss dette spørsmålet i to trinn. Først måler vi den generelle 
sammenhengen mellom uttak av pensjon ved alder 62 og individuell forventet levealder i det fleksible 
norske pensjonssystemet. Deretter studerer vi i hvilken grad personer tar ut pensjon så tidlig som 
mulig som følge av kort forventet levetid. Etter å ha beskrevet sammenhengen mellom forventet 
levealder og tidlig uttak av pensjon er vi også i stand til å beregne ekstrakostnadene av et 
pensjonssystem med fleksibel uttaksalder, relativt til et system med fast uttaksalder. 
 
Hvorvidt enkeltpersoner tar egne levealdersforventninger i betraktning når de bestemmer seg for når 
de skal ta ut alderspensjon er et åpent spørsmål, som kun kan besvares empirisk. Kunnskap om 
sammenhengen mellom tidspunkt for uttak av alderspensjon og forventet levealder er også av praktisk 
relevans: dels på grunn av at en sammenheng mellom tidspunkt for uttak av pensjon og forventet 
levealder kan ha implikasjoner for fordeling av pensjonsinntekt, men også fordi slik kunnskap kan 
være nyttig for å forutsi atferd under andre pensjonssystemer. 
 
Vi finner at personer som velger tidlig uttak av pensjon i stor grad er de som har mest å tjene på tidlig 
uttak, som følge av kort forventet levetid. Videre viser vi, ved å bruke foreldres levetid som 
instrumenter for egen forventet levealder, at deler av denne sammenhengen er kausal: en betydelig 
andel av de som velger tidlig uttak av pensjon ser ut til å gjøre dette fordi det resulterer i høyere 
forventede pensjonsutbetalinger. Til tross for en sterk negativ sammenheng mellom forventet levealder 
og tidlig uttak av pensjon finner vi at ekstrakostnadene for pensjonssystemet som følger av denne 
sammenhengen er heller beskjedne. Dermed bør kostnader som følge av individuelle tilpasninger til 
levealdersjustering av pensjoner ikke tillegges betydelig vekt i utformingen av offentlige 
pensjonssystemer.
1 Introduction
The design of old age pension systems is an issue that is currently of considerable interest,
as most OECD countries are facing challenges due to a combination of graying populations
and strained public finances. In addition to the fiscal challenges, a key challenge is how to
design systems that minimize labor supply distortions and at the same time provide sufficient
insurance against productivity shocks occurring at late stages of the career. The Norwegian old
age pension system offers one promising solution to this challenge, in decoupling the claiming
of old age pensions and the decision to retire from the labor force: Individuals can decide
to claim old age pensions at any age between 62 and 75; benefits are not earnings tested; and
annual benefits are subject to actuarial adjustments based on longevitymeasures specific to each
birth cohort. Hence, the system provides no disincentives to work in terms of implicit taxes on
continued work past the pension eligible age (Gruber and Wise, 1999) - an important feature in
light of the substantial behavioral responses to earnings testing documented by recent studies
(e.g. Song and Manchester, 2007; Haider and Loughran, 2008; Gelber et al., 2013; Hernæs
et al., 2016; Brinch et al., 2017).
The main purpose of this paper is to provide an answer to the following question: How,
and to what extent, is early claiming of public pensions associated with short expected longev-
ity? We approach this question in two steps. First, we measure the overall association between
claiming at age 62 and expected longevity in the Norwegian pension system. Any association
between expected longevity and pension claiming might affect both the distribution of indi-
vidual pension entitlements and the total outlays of pension systems, both of which would be
important components in assessments of the performance and effects of old age pension sys-
tems. Second, we study the extent to which individuals claim pensions early in part because
they act on information about their expected longevity. When faced with a pension system with
flexible claiming and without earnings testing, potential claimants may take into account that
their expected longevities may differ from the average in their birth cohort, and exploit this
difference to increase expected pension payouts, compared to claiming pensions in conjunction
with retirement from the labor force. Such behavior would be an example of adverse selection.
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Delaying claiming is equivalent to buying an annuity: Current pension benefits are given
up in return for a higher future income stream from old age pensions. Empirical evidence of
adverse selection in private markets for annuities is provided by Finkelstein and Poterba (2002,
2004). Although the universal coverage provided by the pension system and the absence of en-
dogenous pricing exclude any concern for missing markets, there are reasons to suspect adverse
selection to take place also in the context of public pension claiming behavior. However, recent
literature has shown that the usual assumption of fully optimizing individuals may not hold
in the context of complex tax and benefit systems (see e.g. Chetty et al., 2009; Brinch et al.,
2017). Another strand of literature studies to what extent financial literacy affects individual
behavior (e.g. Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007). Whether and to what extent individuals are taking
longevity expectations into account when deciding when to start claiming pensions is of direct
relevance to both these strands of literature. Knowledge about the extent to which individuals
act on information about their expected longevity in claiming behavior might also be useful for
predicting behavior under different potential social security schemes.
Our paper is closely related to a literature on claiming behavior and life expectancy in the
US. Empirical analyses of mortality and pension claiming date back to Wolfe (1983), who
finds that those who claim their social security pension at age 62 have higher mortality than
those who claim at age 65. Coile et al. (2002) show that it would be beneficial for many
to delay claiming but that few actually do. Hurd et al. (2004) study the effects of subjective
survival on retirement and Social Security claiming, and find that those with very low subjective
probabilities of survival both retired earlier and claimed earlier than others. Hurd and Panis
(2006) find no evidence of adverse selection associated with cash-out of pension rights in the
event of job separation or retirement.
Also related to our paper are some studies of annuitization decisions (e.g. Brown, 2001;
Hagen, 2015) and of labor supply effects of removing earnings testing. Engelhardt and Kumar
(2009) and Disney and Smith (2002) study the repeal of earnings tests with a deferral mech-
anism (in the US and in the UK, respectively), and both find that labor supply responses are
concentrated mostly in groups of individuals who are likely to find the earnings test particularly
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disadvantageous; those with high mortality risks and those facing liquidity constraints.
Unlike earlier studies of claiming behavior, our paper addresses the relationship between
expected longevity and claiming behavior in a system in which claiming and retirement de-
cisions are largely decoupled: We study the first birth cohort to enter the recently reformed
Norwegian pension system at age 62. We simulate expected longevities and expected present
values of pensions conditional on claiming at age 62, the minimum pensionable age, and age
67, the normal retirement age in the system. We then construct the relative money’s worth
of the two annuities characterized by claiming pensions at age 62 and age 67, respectively,
defined as the ratio of the expected present value of the two benefit streams. We find that a
one percent increase in the relative money’s worth is associated with a 4 percentage points (12
percent) reduction in claiming at age 62. Although the measured selection amounts to as much
as one third of the full potential for our expected longevity measure, the costs to public funds
are rather moderate: Compared to a situation in which there is no difference between early and
late claimers in terms of expected longevity, the observed selection in early claiming increases
the expected present value of the outlays of public pensions for early claimers by a modest 0.8
percent.
Following Finkelstein and Poterba (2002), we further distinguish active selection from the
overall association between the relative money’s worth and claiming. Active selection is in our
setting driven by individuals making claiming decisions based in part on their knowledge of
their prospective mortality. Our first step towards an estimate of the amount of active selection
is to control for a wide range of potential predictors of claiming behavior. To this end, we make
use of a 2SLS framework in which parental longevities are used as instruments for the relative
money’s worth. This approach gives us an estimate of the association between the relative
money’s worth and early claiming that is identified based on variation in parental longevities
only, and not by variation in the other covariates contained in the set of controls, most of which
are also used in the estimation of expected longevity.
Secondly, we take into account that retirement and claiming decisions might be jointly
determined by studying the effects of the relative money’s worth on all combinations of the
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two outcomes. Acknowledging the possibility that the variables capturing parental longevities
may be correlated with claiming outcomes not only through the relative money’s worth, we
interpret the association between the relative money’s worth and early claiming as evidence of
active selection only to the extent that there is an effect of the relative money’s worth on the
joint outcome “Claiming and not retired”. We find active selection to be statistically significant
at the one percent level, with a one percent increase in the relative money’s worth reducing
claiming at age 62 by one percentage point (three percent). This point estimate represents a
lower bound on the part of the overall association between the relative money’s worth and early
claiming that can be attributed to active selection.
We challenge the robustness of our results on active selection in several ways. First, we
investigate the impacts of excluding net wealth and a proxy for health conditions, respectively,
from the set of controls. These exclusions do not substantially alter the estimated effect of the
relative money’s worth, suggesting that our results on active selection are not likely to be driven
by liquidity constraints or a correlation between parental longevities and health conditions. We
also perform a placebo test based on an older cohort making claiming and retirement decisions
within the context of the pre-reform pension system; that is, absent any mechanisms that would
generate incentives for active selection. We find no evidence of active selection for the placebo
cohort, indicating that the active selection effects that we do find are indeed particular to the
cohorts facing incentives for claiming that depend on expected longevity.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional setting, the data and our
estimation sample. Section 3 relates claiming behavior to the theory of annuity demand and
spells out the details regarding our operationalization of expected longevity and the relative
money’s worth (our measure of incentives for early claiming). Section 4 presents results in
terms of the overall association between the relative money’s worth and claiming behavior, and
discusses the implication of these results for the additional costs to public funds arising from
selection in early claiming. Section 5 describes our approach for estimating active selection
effects, and presents the empirical results followed by the results from a number of robustness
checks. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Institutional setting and data
2.1 Institutional setting
The Norwegian old age pension system is based on the National Insurance Scheme (NIS), a
public pay-as-you-go defined benefit plan with universal coverage. As of January 2011, the
NIS old age pension system offers a fair amount of flexibility by being characterized by the
following three main features: (i) Pensions can be claimed at any age between 62 and 75, (ii)
yearly benefits are subject to actuarial adjustments based on mean expected longevity for each
cohort, and (iii) pension benefits are not earnings or means tested.
For an individual to be eligible for early claiming, her accumulated pension wealth must be
high enough to ensure a mandated minimum level of pension benefits from age 67. Eligible
individuals may choose whether to draw the entire pension or only a fraction of it; 20, 40, 50,
60, 80 or 100%. After the initial choice, however, the fraction of benefits claimed can only be
changed to a number other than 0 or 100% after 12 months and only once every year, but it can
be set to 0 or 100% at any time. The calibration of the deferral mechanism is specific to each
birth cohort; for individuals born in 1949, claiming full pensions from age 62 rather than from
age 67 reduces annual benefits by 22%. Early claiming is therefore slightly less costly than in
the current U.S. Social Security system, in which annual benefits are 25% lower for individuals
claiming at age 62 rather than at the normal retirement age of 66. Pensions under payment
are regulated according to the average wage growth in the economy, minus 0.75 percent, and
benefits are paid until a person dies.
For cohorts born before 1953, pension entitlements are accumulated as specified by the old
pension scheme, in which the pension benefits are based on a two tier system, consisting of a
basic pension and a supplementary earnings based pension. A full basic pension is approxim-
ately equal to one Basic Amount1 per year, and an additional minimum pension is granted to
individuals not qualifying for the earnings based pension. The supplementary earnings based
1The Basic Amount (BA) is a central feature of the public pension system in Norway. It is adjusted every
year, with a nominal rate of growth varying between 2 and 13% since its introduction in 1967, and from the late
nineties and onwards in accordance with the average wage growth in the economy. The average BA for 2011 is
78,024 NOK, which at the time of writing corresponds to about 9,000 USD or 8,500 EUR.
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pension is determined by labor income earned between ages 17 and 69, and full supplementary
pensions can be obtained after 40 years of contributions. The main determinant of the supple-
mentary pension is an average point score, which is calculated on the basis of the individual’s
20 highest annual incomes measured in units of the Basic Amount (see e.g. Brinch et al. (2017)
for details).
Another important institution, besides the NIS, is the contractual early retirement scheme
AFP, which covers all public sector workers and approximately half of the private sector work-
ers. As of 2011, the private sector AFP scheme is fully integrated with the NIS: It is an ac-
tuarially adjusted, non-earnings tested lifelong supplementary benefit available to workers in
affiliated firms who fulfill a set of individual requirements related to past earnings and tenure
in AFP affiliated firms. Benefits can be claimed at any age between 62 and 75, in combination
with the NIS old age pension, and conditional on employment in an affiliated firm at the time
of claiming. In contrast, the public sector AFP scheme is rather rigid, in the sense that bene-
fits are earnings tested and foregone benefits are not compensated by means of higher future
benefits. Benefits are available from age 62 and until age 67, when recipients are transfered to
the NIS, and public sector AFP benefits can not be combined with NIS old age pensions. For
a public sector employee who wishes to retire at age 62, the AFP scheme is clearly the most
attractive option, since pension benefits are calculated as if she had continued working until the
normal retirement age of 67. Public sector employees who wish to combine pension benefits
with full time labor earnings would be better off by taking the new and more flexible NIS old
age pension.
When the new pension system was implemented in January 2011, a large number of indi-
viduals aged 62-66 immediately became eligible for the flexible old age pension. Our focus,
however, is on those who became eligible throughout 2011 by reaching age 62. The reason
for focusing on the 62-year-olds, as opposed to the larger 62-66-years sample, is that the latter
sample is self-selected in a very complicated manner. Not only had a large subgroup of these
individuals the opportunity to claim the AFP early retirement benefits under the old regime;
they also had the opportunity to evaluate whether it would be beneficial for them to claim pen-
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sions under the old regime, or wait until January 2011 to benefit from the new and more flexible
pension regime. Our sample of 62-year-olds have never been exposed to the pre-reform early
retirement scheme, which simplifies matters with regards to self-selection. In this respect, they
are also similar to later cohorts, which makes our analysis of 62-year-olds a good starting point
for understanding the behavior of later cohorts.
With our approach we expect to capture most of the selection in the direction of early
claiming, as we expect the results of optimizing behavior to be either to claim pensions as
early as possible, to claim pensions when retiring from the labor force, or to delay claiming
for as long as possible. Our analysis will not capture the effects of selection in the direction
of claiming pensions as late as possible; it will be hard to say much about this until a decade
or so has passed. We do observe, however, whether individuals choose to delay claiming even
though they retire from the labor market.
2.2 Data, sample, and descriptive statistics
The data used in this paper combines several administrative registers linked by unique personal
identification numbers. One is the Register of Employers and Employees, which contains both
firm and individual specific information for all job spells and covers the entire Norwegian work-
ing age population. The data also contains detailed demographic information for all residents,
including birth and death dates, gender, level of education, and information on parental longev-
ities. We can identify recipients of AFP, disability and old age pensions, and we have access
to individual pensionable earnings data dating back to 1967 (the year in which the NIS was
introduced), which allows us to identify eligibility for early take-up of NIS pension benefits.
We start out with all Norwegian citizens born between January and November 1949, who
were alive and resident by the end of 2010; 52,991 individuals.2 Individuals are classified as
working if their pensionable income in 2010 exceeds 1 BA, and if they did not receive disability
or survivor pension benefits in the same year. Among those classified as working, individuals
2Individuals born in December 1949 are left out, as they are not eligible for claiming pensions until January
2012.
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Table 1: The Norwegian 1949 birth cohort, their status in 2010 and eligibility for early claiming
Public pension eligibility at age 62
Not eligible Eligible
Working
In private sector AFP affiliated firm 1,814 (6.13) 7,029 (30.03)
In private sector non-affiliated firm 1,774 (6.00) 4,897 (20.92)
In public sector firm 5,228 (17.67) 8,492 (36.28)
Self employed and other 895 (3.03) 1,723 (7.36)
Non-working
On disability pension rolls 18,110 (61.22) 845 (3.61)
Outside disability 1,761 (5.95) 423 (1.81)
N 29,582 23,409
Percentages of the total number of individuals not eligible and eligible, respectively, in
parentheses.
with at least one active record in the employment registry at the end of the year and with wage
income above 1 BA are classified as employed in one out of three different sectors, according
to the sector affiliation of their main employer: private sector with AFP coverage, private sector
without AFP coverage, or public sector.3 The residual category “self employed and other” in-
cludes, in addition to the self employed, unemployment benefit recipients and other individuals
having pensionable income above 1 BA, but no active employment relationship at the end of
the year.
Table 1 describes the labor market status by the end of 2010 for all individuals in the cohort,
separately for those eligible and those not eligible to start receiving public pension benefits from
age 62. Starting with the non-eligible, we note that a vast majority (67 percent) is classified
as non-working, and that most of the non-working and non-eligible are receiving disability
pensions or survivor pension benefits. 95 percent of the 23,409 individuals who were eligible
for claiming public pension benefits from age 62 are classified as working, and 66 percent are
working in a public or private sector AFP affiliated firm.
Our analysis is focused on individuals who are eligible for claiming NIS pensions at age 62
and not receiving disability pension benefits in 2010; a sample of 22,564 individuals, for which
3To identify the AFP affiliation of private sector firms, we make use of the fact that all workers in an AFP
affiliated firm are automatically covered by the scheme: We track the previous employment of all individuals
observed to be receiving early retirement pensions, and classify a firm as AFP affiliated if it has at least one
previous employee who later received AFP pension benefits.
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descriptive statistics are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix Section A.3. We note that 76%
of our sample are men, compared to 51% in the full cohort (Table A2 in the Appendix Section
A.3); that very few have a history of disability benefits receipt; and that the individuals in our
sample are relatively well educated.
3 Annuity demand and the money’s worth
3.1 Annuity demand
Postponed claiming of pension benefits is equivalent to the purchase of additional Social Secur-
ity annuities, with the foregone current benefits being the price an individual pays in order to
receive higher benefits for the remaining life span in return (Coile et al., 2002). As is clear from
the theory of annuity demand, there are two distinct motives for buying annuities: an income
maximization and an insurance motive.
Let the money’s worth of an annuity be defined as the expected present value of the annuity
divided by its price. In the absence of any insurance motive, a risk neutral income maximizing
individual will be better off by buying an annuity for which the money’s worth is larger than
unity. An individual faced with a risk of outliving her resources may want to buy an annuity
even if the expected present value of the annuity is lower than its price.4 In this study we
put more emphasis on the income maximization motive than on the insurance motive, mainly
because the risk of outliving one’s resources does not seem particularly relevant for the popula-
tion under study. All Norwegian citizens have access to a public pension system that provides a
basic annuity, and most individuals will not even be close to spending all their resources before
they die.5 Moreover, as the prices of the different annuities in the Norwegian public pension
system are given exogenously, the market will exist even in the absence of insurance motives.
This stands in contrast to the case of private annuity markets, where noone would sell annuities
4Yaari (1965) originally pointed out how life annuities can increase welfare by insuring individuals against
the risk of outliving one’s resources.
5Although data on savings is not of the highest quality, there are clear indications that the average pensioner
in Norway saves money every year rather than drawing down on her wealth; see Halvorsen (2011).
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if the only buyers would be those who would gain, in expected terms, from buying the annuity.
3.2 The relative money’s worth of implicit annuities
The money’s worth is a useful way of characterizing individual incentives for buying annuities.
In the context of a Social Security system with flexible claiming dates, individuals can choose
from a menu of implicit annuities characterized by the age at claiming. Rather than working
with the full menu of annuities, we focus on those resulting from delaying claiming until age
67, the normal retirement age, relative to claiming at age 62, the minimum pensionable age.
Let Aca denote the annual gross pensions received at age a by an individual who first claims
pensions at age c. The money’s worth of the additional annuity associated with delaying claim-
ing from age 62 to age 67 is now
MW =
∑∞a=67 sa(1+r)a−62A67a −∑∞a=67 sa(1+r)a−62A62a
∑66a=62 sa(1+r)a−62A62a
,
where sa is the probability of survival to age a. Actuarial neutrality requires that MW = 1.
When this condition holds, there are no expected gains associated with delaying claiming. If
MW > 1, however, delayed claiming will increase expected lifetime income. In the following,
we will use an easily interpretable incentive measure that we term the relative money’s worth
(RMW); the ratio of the present value of gross pensions resulting from claiming at age 67 to the
present value of gross pensions resulting from claiming at age 62:
RMW =
∑∞a=67 sa(1+r)a−62A67a
∑∞a=62 sa(1+r)a−62A62a
.
RMW measures the relative increase in expected pensions resulting from delaying claiming
from age 62 to 67.6 One may think of RMW as being a function of expected longevity, with
short expected lifetimes being associated with low values of RMW .
We see from the expressions for MW and RMW above that, besides the individual survival
6Note thatMW > 1 if and only if RMW > 1, and that the two measures capture essentially the same informa-
tion.
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probabilities, the choice of discount rate (r) will be important for distinguishing between those
who will gain and those who will lose from claiming pensions at age 62 compared to at age 67.
Note, however, that the discount rate primarily affects the level of MW or RMW , while what
we exploit for estimation purposes is the variation in RMW between individuals. The choice of
discount rate is therefore not crucial to our estimation results.7 Note further that the focus on
claiming at age 62 compared to claiming at age 67 is not of crucial importance for the purpose
of estimation; RMW is approximately 5 times the gain from delaying claiming from age 62 to
age 63.
3.3 Mortality models and expected longevity at age 62
We do not observe subjective longevity expectations, but instead make use of a wide range of
observable characteristics to estimate expected longevities based on observed mortality for the
entire Norwegian population over the years 2001-2010.8 The basis for our measure of expected
longevity is a logit model for the mortality probability of age group a in time t and county g,
which is estimated separately for men and women:
Pr(M|x,a, t,g) = exp(τt +λg+θa+ x
′β )
1+ exp(τt +λg+θa+ x′β ) ,
where τt , λg, and θa are parameters specifying year, county, and age fixed effects. x contains
a set of individual background characteristics: educational attainment, disability history, and
civil status (single, married/cohabiting, with or without children). These enter as three groups
of dummies, each interacted with functions of age to produce explanatory variable specific age
7We set the discount rate r equal to the interest rate implicit in the NIS, i.e. to the average nominal wage
growth. Since future benefits are indexed by average nominal wage growth, through the Basic Amount, this
means that 1 Basic Amount of pensions has the same value to the individual irrespective of which year it is
received. To verify that our results are indeed robust to the choice of discount rate we have done analyses based on
a substantially (two percentage points) higher interest rate. The alternative RMW measure is strongly correlated
with our baseline measure (correlation coefficient = 0.9856), and results do not change substantially.
8Studies using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) have found that subjective probabilities
of survival are generally close to their objective counterparts, as measured by estimated probabilities using actual
mortality realizations on HRS respondents over a 10-year period (Khwaja, Sloan and Chung, 2007) and by survival
probabilities calculated from life tables (Hurd and McGarry, 1995, 2002).
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profiles. The age profiles are specified as quadratic splines, i.e. we specify subvectors of x as
(ax j,a2x j, {a> k j1}(a− k j1)2x j, . . . , {a> k jm}(a− k jm)2x j),
where x j is a given background characteristic dummy, e.g. for low educational attainment, and
the knots k j1, . . . ,k jm are chosen by visual inspection of more complex models in which age
specific dummies are estimated for each covariate group.9
Also contained in x is information on the longevity of parents.10 For individuals whose
parents are still alive in a given year we impute parental longevities based on expected longev-
ities, as a function of gender, year and cohort, taken from official mortality tables. As the
effects of parental longevities are found to be highly nonlinear, we define the following cov-
ariates: mother/father unknown, mother/father emigrated, and mother/father dead before age
50 (dummies). In addition, we include separate linear terms in mother’s/father’s longevities if
between 50 and 65 or above 65, respectively. Information about parental longevities is included
in the mortality model for individuals of age 56 or older. Summary statistics for the mortality
estimation are provided in Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix Section A.3.
To predict expected longevities and calculate the RMW for each individual in the sample,
we use estimated coefficients from the mortality models11 along with detailed pension accu-
mulation histories within the framework of the MOSART microsimulation model.12 We start
out with the full 1949 birth cohort in 2010 and run the model forward year-by-year, to simulate
survival and present values of future pension benefits. We run the simulation 900 times, and
approximate expected longevity at age 62 by taking the average over these 900 predictions.
9The reason for estimating models with quadratic splines is simply to obtain unrestrictive prediction models
for age-specific mortality without undue overfitting.
10We know the parents’ identities for all cohorts born in 1964 or later. For older cohorts, we make use of
nationwide censuses conducted from 1960 and onwards to link children with their parents based on surnames and
place of residence. With this procedure we are not able to identify the parents of those not living with their parents
in 1960, and therefore we only use information on parents for cohorts born after 1935.
11Coefficients for year effects beyond 2010 are calibrated so that the average mortality for each cohort cor-
respond to official Norwegian population forecasts. Our analysis is not sensitive to this calibration since these
parameters primarily affect the level of expected longevity for a cohort, while our study uses the variation in
expected longevity within a cohort.
12While the MOSART model is built to simulate a wide range of outcomes for the full population, we single
out only the parts that are of direct use for our purpose. See e.g. Fredriksen (1998) and Fredriksen and Stølen
(2011) for details on the MOSART model.
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Figure 1: Histogram and density plot of expected longevity at age 62
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Notes: The estimation sample consists of individuals who are eligible for public pension take-up at age 62 and not
receiving DI pensions in 2010.
Figure 1 (a) shows how the model spans out expected longevity for individuals eligible for
claiming pensions at age 62. The distribution ranges from 76 to 93 years with an average of
86.4, and is bimodal, owing mainly to the difference in average expected longevity between
men and women. Figure 1 (b) highlights the difference in expected longevities according to
eligibility for early claiming. The distribution for the full cohort has a much heavier left tail
and slightly more mass to the right of the leftmost mode than that for eligible individuals only.
These differences are due to individuals on disability insurance rolls and women with insuf-
ficient pension accumulations, respectively.13 For the full cohort, the standard deviation of
expected longevity at age 62 is 3.3 years. This is well in line with Hosseini (2015), who estim-
ates a standard deviation of subjective expected longevities of approximately four years based
on data from the HRS.
Figure 2 (a) shows a scatterplot of expected longevity against the relative money’s worth for
individuals eligible to claim pensions at age 62. The figure shows a strong association between
the relative expected value of gross pensions and expected longevity, with a correlation of 0.96
and only a small number of outliers. These outliers arise from different idiosyncrasies in the
13To summarize the magnitude of the effects of different covariates on expected longevity generated by this
complex nonlinear model, we report the results of a linear regression of expected longevity on all the covariates
used in the mortality models, for the full 1949 cohort, in Table A5 in the Appendix Section A.3.
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Figure 2: The relative money’s worth and expected longevity
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Notes: The sample consists of individuals who are eligible for public pension take-up at age 62 and not receiving
DI pensions in 2010.
pension system.14 Note that we have normalized our RMW measure so that it equals 1 for
individuals with expected longevity corresponding to the full sample average of 86 years.15 By
focusing on the deviations from the mean of the cohort, our approach is orthogonal to recent
work on US data studying how the attractiveness of delaying claiming varies between cohorts
(Shoven and Slavov, 2012, 2013).
While there is considerable variation in both expected longevity and in the relative money’s
worth across individuals in our sample, it should also be noted that the effect of expected
longevity on the relative money’s worth is of a modest magnitude: One additional year of
expected longevity translates into slightly more than a 0.01 unit increase in the relative money’s
worth. Hence, an individual expecting to live for one year longer than the cohort average will
increase his expected lifetime pensions by about one percent by postponing claiming of pension
benefits by five years. This moderate effect is not a consequence of very high discount rates,
although discount rates will have some impact on our incentive measure - it simply follows
from the fact that the gains from postponing claiming are small. We elaborate further on this in
14Survivor pension benefits, for instance, will tend to make it very profitable to postpone the claiming of own
pensions for individuals whose deceased spouse had relatively high pension accumulations.
15Since the Norwegian deferral mechanism is based on actuarially neutral rates for an individual with average
longevity, the RMW measure would be fairly close to 1 for an average individual also without the normalization.
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the Appendix Section A.1 by means of a simple numerical example.
4 Early claiming of flexible old age pensions
4.1 Early claiming and the relative money’s worth
In this section, we first describe the aggregate claiming behavior of our estimation sample, be-
fore moving on to an assessment of the relationship between early claiming and the relative
money’s worth. Column (2) of Table 2 shows that 34 percent of the full estimation sample
are early claimers, i.e. they have chosen to start receiving (a fraction of) their public pension
in 2011.16 The same table also shows the fraction of early claimers by sex and educational
attainment, which gives a first indication of selection in claiming behavior: Early claiming
is considerably more common among groups of workers whose average expected longevity is
known to be relatively low; men, and individuals with low educational attainment. When divid-
ing the sample into three groups according to individuals’ firm affiliation at age 61 (leaving out
the 423 eligible individuals who are not classified as working in 2010), we see that early claim-
ing is most common among workers in private sector AFP affiliated firms, followed by workers
in private sector non-affiliated firms and the self-employed, while early claiming is relatively
uncommon among workers in the public sector. These differences are probably partly due to
the fact that the groups differ according to their occupational pension coverage, as described in
Section 2.1, but they might also reflect the high shares of women and highly educated workers
in the public sector (see Table A6 in the Appendix Section A.3).
For a more precise assessment of the extent to which claiming decisions are related to indi-
vidual life expectancies, we proceed by measuring the overall association between the relative
money’s worth and early claiming. To this end, we first estimate easily interpretable linear
probability models of the following form:
Y = α+ρRMW + ε, (1)
16We make no distinction between claiming the full pension and claiming only a fraction of it. More than 90
percent of early claimers are claiming a full pension.
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Table 2: Effects of RMW on early claiming
Dep.
N Mean OLS 2SLSa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample
Full estimation sample 22564 34.1 -4.07∗∗∗ (0.12) -1.20∗∗∗ (0.33)
Men 17051 38.8 -3.92∗∗∗ (0.22) -1.16∗∗∗ (0.38)
Women 5513 19.3 -2.78∗∗∗ (0.32) -1.31∗ (0.67)
Educational attainment
Primary/missing education 8092 45.3 -2.55∗∗∗ (0.23) -1.36∗∗ (0.57)
High school 7655 35.8 -3.37∗∗∗ (0.21) -0.96∗ (0.57)
Higher education 6817 18.8 -2.82∗∗∗ (0.19) -1.27∗∗ (0.56)
Individuals working in 2010, by firm affiliation
Private sector, no AFPb 6620 35.4 -2.69∗∗∗ (0.24) -1.22∗∗ (0.59)
Private sector, with AFP 7029 55.0 -2.80∗∗∗ (0.27) -0.81 (0.69)
Public sector 8492 15.1 -2.00∗∗∗ (0.14) -1.48∗∗∗ (0.46)
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p< 0.10, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01.
The full estimation sample includes all individuals eligible for early claiming and not receiving
disability pensions in 2010.
a The set of controls includes dummies for AFP affiliation (2010), sex, receipt of disability bene-
fits prior to the age of 62, educational attainment (three categories), civil status (four categories),
dummies for the number of months on sickness leave at age 61, dummies for net wealth quartiles
(measured in 2010), and dummies for labor income quartiles and employment status (measured
in 2010). Information on parental longevities is used to form instrumental variables in the 2SLS
estimations.
b Includes workers in private sector firms not affiliated with AFP, and the group “Self employed
and other”.
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where Y is an indicator for the outcome claiming NIS pensions in 2011. Estimates of ρ from
equation (1) estimated for the full estimation sample and separately for each of the above men-
tioned sub-groups are provided in Column (3) of Table 2. Starting with the full estimation
sample, the point estimate of −4.07 indicates that a one percent increase in the expected gains
from claiming pensions at age 67 relative to age 62 is associated with a 4 percentage points (12
percent) decrease in the probability of early claiming. An increase in the relative money’s worth
of one standard deviation (0.025) is associated with a 30 percent decrease in the probability of
claiming.
Turning to the different sub-groups, we first note that the estimated associations between the
relative money’s worth and early claiming are negative and significant at the one percent level
in all eight cases. When evaluated relative to the respective sample means, the magnitude of the
association is higher for women than for men, and it is increasing with educational attainment.
The association appears to be considerably stronger among workers in public sector firms than
among the two groups of private sector workers.
Figure 3 shows the fraction of early claimers at each decile of the RMW distribution. We
see that except for at the first decile, moving up from one decile to the next is associated with
a lower propensity for early claiming. The relationship between the fraction of early claimers
and RMW is close to linear, and the slope of the fitted regression line is −0.037, meaning that
the average difference in the propensity for early claiming between two subsequent deciles is
3.7 percentage points.
4.2 The cost of selection in early claiming to public funds
To illustrate the cost to public funds of selection in early claiming, we contrast the amount of
selection that we do observe with the following two polar cases: no selection, and the maximum
amount of selection that one could observe, given our measure of expected longevity. The
case of no selection corresponds to claiming behavior being orthogonal to the relative money’s
worth, and hence its average value should equal 1 for both early and late claimers. At the other
extreme, “full” selection would correspond to the case in which the 34 percent of early claimers
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Figure 3: The fraction of early claimers by deciles of the RMW distribution.
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in our estimation sample all belong to the lower tail of the RMW distribution. The average
relative money’s worth for individuals at the 34th percentile and below equals 0.975, which
means that “full” selection would increase the expected cost of pension outlays to early claimers
by 2.5 percent, relative to a situation with no selection. The average relative money’s worth for
those who are in fact observed as early claimers equals 0.992, meaning that while the observed
selection corresponds to about 32 percent of the maximum potential, given our measure of
expected longevity, it only increases the cost to public funds by a modest 0.8 percent.17
5 Active selection
5.1 Controlling for observables
We take the results presented so far as evidence of a considerable amount of selection in early
claiming: There is a clear tendency that individuals who have more to gain by claiming early
are more likely to be the ones who are claiming early. With this being established, note that
17Since we have normalized the relative money’s worth to equal 1 for individuals with expected longevity
corresponding to the sample average, this cost should not be interpreted as a measure of the total costs or benefits
associated with early claiming. It is rather a measure of the extra costs associated with selection in early claiming
compared to a situation in which claiming is orthogonal to the relative money’s worth.
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the overall association between the relative money’s worth and claiming behavior captured by
the simple OLS estimates can be thought of as arising from two different types of selection: (i)
active selection, represented by individuals claiming early in part because they expect to gain
in terms of the expected present value of pension benefits, and (ii) passive selection, defined
residually from other mechanisms generating a correlation between expected longevity and
claiming. One example of such a mechanismmay be that claiming and retirement decisions are
to some extent coordinated, and that people with characteristics predictive of early retirement,
e.g. low educational attainment, will typically also have short expected longevities. We address
this issue in Section 5.2 below. Other mechanisms may be that individuals with characteristics
predicting short expected longevity for some other reason claim pensions early to a greater
extent than others - maybe because of issues related to financial literacy, or by men behaving
differently from women in financial decision making.
We take a first step towards an estimate of the amount of active selection by conditioning on
characteristics that may be correlated with early claiming without directly reflecting incentives
for early claiming. The relative money’s worth is by construction a nonlinear function of many
of the variables that would naturally belong in the set of controls. We therefore apply a two
stage least squares (2SLS) regression framework, using information on parental longevities
as instruments for the relative money’s worth. The first and second stage regressions can be
described as follows:
RMW = α1+X ′β1+Z′γ+ ε1 (2)
Y = α2+X ′β2+ρ2̂RMW + ε2, (3)
where equation (2) is the first stage regression, and where the actual values of RMW are re-
placed by predicted values from equation (2) in the second stage regression, equation (3). X is
a vector of observable characteristics, containing dummies for sex, receipt of disability benefits
prior to the age of 62, educational attainment (three categories), and civil status (four categor-
ies). Dummies for the number of months on sickness leave at age 61 are included to control for
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health conditions. In addition, we control for net wealth, labor income and employment status
in 2010, by including dummy variables specifying the quartiles in the income and wealth distri-
butions, and dummies for the group “self employed and other” and for individuals not working
in 2010. Z is a vector containing information on parental longevities, specified as described in
Section 3.3.
Our 2SLS framework has a slightly different motivation from standard uses of instrumental
variable techniques. Our variable of interest, RMW , is a nonlinear function of a subset of
the observables contained in X , because it is based in part on estimated age specific mortality
rates, as described in Section 3.3. To avoid multicollinearity we therefore need an exclusion
restriction. One could control linearly for X in a multivariate OLS setup. However, the effect
of RMW would then be identified not only from variation in RMW generated by the excluded
variables (parental longevities), but also from the nonlinear relationship between variables in X
and RMW . The 2SLS framework ensures that the estimated association between RMW and the
outcomes are identified based on variation in parental longevities only.
2SLS estimates of ρ2 are provided in Column (5) of Table 2, for the full sample and for
each of the eight sub-groups. As expected, the 2SLS point estimates are quite a bit smaller in
magnitude than the corresponding simple OLS estimates in Column (3). While the full sample
coefficient is significant at the one percent level, some of the subgroup point estimates are not
statistically distinguishable from zero. This lack of precision appears to a large extent to be
driven by small sample sizes.
Our regression analysis also serves the purpose of identifying other predictors of early
claiming. To this end, we report the full set of estimates from the second stage regression
in Table 3. First, note that the differences in early claiming between the groups in Table 2
are present also conditional on other characteristics, although they are smaller than what ap-
pears from the unadjusted means: Men are more likely than women to claim early; those with
low educational attainment are more likely early claimers than those with high educational at-
tainment; and early claiming is least common in the public sector, and most common among
workers in private sector firms with AFP coverage. Other important predictors of early claiming
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are labor income and net wealth; those with lower income and those with lower net wealth prior
to eligibility for early claiming are more likely to be claiming early than are their counterparts
with higher income or higher net wealth.
5.2 Joint analysis of retirement and claiming
Although claiming and retirement decisions are notionally decoupled in the new flexible sys-
tem, there are features such as taxes on wage and pension income and capital market imper-
fections that prevent them from being perfectly decoupled. One might therefore suspect the
established association between the relative money’s worth (or equivalently, expected longev-
ity) and claiming decisions to be driven by expected longevity influencing retirement behavior,
which in turn causes claiming behavior. In this section, we estimate a lower bound on the
magnitude of the direct effect of the relative money’s worth on early claiming, i.e. on the part
of the effect that is not driven by a relationship between expected longevity and the retirement
decision. The key ingredients of this exercise are theoretical predictions for the effects of the
relative money’s worth on each of the four possible combinations of early claiming and retire-
ment outcomes, and their empirical counterparts represented by estimates obtained within our
2SLS regression framework.18
5.2.1 Theoretical predictions
In Appendix Section A.1 we set up a simple model of claiming and retirement behavior, in
which the pension system has the same main features as the NIS; no earnings testing, and
actuarial adjustments for early or late claiming. The main purpose of this model is to show that
with such a decoupled claiming/retirement system, and absent capital market imperfections,
distortive taxes and other regulations or interventions, individuals will choose when to start
claiming pensions without regards to the retirement decision, and vice versa. The relative
money’s worth matters only for the claiming decision and not for the retirement decision. More
18Since both retirement and claiming are outcomes, it is not a prudent empirical strategy to condition on one
of them, such as e.g. studying claiming behavior conditional on retirement.
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Table 3: Second stage regression; full estimation sample
Dependent variable: Claiming at age 62
RMW -1.1953∗∗∗ (0.3290)
Male 0.0693∗∗∗ (0.0161)
Educational attainment (ref: higher education)
Primary/missing 0.1066∗∗∗ (0.0097)
High school 0.0729∗∗∗ (0.0077)
Receipt of disability benefits (ref: never received)
Received prior to age 62 -0.0843∗ (0.0481)
Civil status (ref: married/cohabiting, at least one child)
Married, no children -0.0434∗∗∗ (0.0155)
Single, at least one child -0.0246 (0.0461)
Single/cohabiting, no children -0.0370∗∗∗ (0.0086)
Working in public sector -0.1414∗∗∗ (0.0084)
Working in private sector with AFP 0.1919∗∗∗ (0.0090)
Labor income quartiles and employment status (ref: first quartile)
Q2 -0.0081 (0.0088)
Q3 -0.0401∗∗∗ (0.0089)
Q4 -0.0661∗∗∗ (0.0096)
Self employed and other -0.0029 (0.0142)
Not working 0.0796∗∗∗ (0.0261)
Net wealth quartiles (ref: first quartile)
Q2 -0.0289∗∗∗ (0.0083)
Q3 -0.0463∗∗∗ (0.0083)
Q4 -0.0748∗∗∗ (0.0085)
Number of months on sickness leave at age 61 (ref: zero)
One 0.0242 (0.0175)
Two 0.0070 (0.0134)
Three 0.0208 (0.0160)
Four 0.0295 (0.0202)
Five -0.0042 (0.0218)
Six -0.0314 (0.0260)
Seven -0.0186 (0.0296)
Eight -0.0395 (0.0342)
Nine -0.0920∗∗∗ (0.0348)
Ten -0.0574 (0.0375)
Eleven -0.1688∗∗∗ (0.0393)
Twelve -0.1853∗∗∗ (0.0441)
Constant 1.5349∗∗∗ (0.3577)
R2 0.1566
N 22564
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Sample: Individuals eligible for pension take-up
and not receiving disability pensions in 2010.
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generally, a change in the factors affecting claiming will not affect retirement, and a change in
the factors affecting retirement will not affect claiming. In reality, however, different types of
imperfections, regulations and interventions tend to make coordinated claiming and retirement
outcomes (claiming and retiring; not claiming and not retiring) more attractive than the non-
coordinated ones (claiming and not retiring; not claiming and retiring), relative to what would
be the case in a perfectly decoupled system.
In the following, we refer to a coupled system as one in which a penalty applies for not
coordinating claiming and retirement behavior, or one in which a bonus applies if decisions
are coordinated. One example of a coupled system is the current US system, for individuals
below the normal retirement age. Since their pension benefits are earnings tested, combining
early claiming with continued work is simply not feasible. Another example is a system which
is notionally decoupled, but not accompanied by a perfect capital market, so that individuals
wanting to borrow in order to finance early retirement without claiming pensions will have to
pay an interest rate strictly higher than the market interest rate. In this example, the maximum
utility resulting from the outcome “not claiming and retiring” will be lower than in a perfectly
decoupled system, since some resources are lost through a higher interest rate. A third ex-
ample of a coupled system is one that is decoupled at the gross pension level, but not at the net
pension level, due to progressive taxation. This applies to the Norwegian system. Progressive
taxation discriminates slightly against not coordinating claiming and retirement, as coordina-
tion of claiming and retirement decisions amounts to income smoothing and therefore leads to
higher net income.
While in a perfectly decoupled system, an improvement in the incentives for early claiming
may induce individuals to claim without affecting their retirement decision, this need not be the
case in a coupled system: Improving the incentives for early claiming may induce individuals
to claim and to retire, and improving the incentives to retire may lead individuals to both retire
and claim pensions. However, an improvement in the incentives for early claiming and an
improvement in the incentives to retire will have different implications in terms of changes in
the joint outcomes of retirement and early claiming, which can be summarized as follows: In a
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coupled system, an improvement in the incentives for early claiming may lead individuals
1. from not claiming pensions and not retiring to claiming pensions and not retiring,
2. from not claiming pensions and retiring to claiming pensions and retiring, and
3. from not claiming pensions and not retiring to claiming pensions and retiring.
An improvement in the incentives to retire may lead individuals
1. from not claiming pensions and not retiring to not claiming pensions and retiring,
2. from claiming pensions and not retiring to claiming pensions and retiring, and
3. from not claiming pensions and not retiring to claiming pensions and retiring.
That is, while improvements in the incentives for early claiming and improvements in the in-
centives to retire will have the same implications in terms of effects on coordinated outcomes,
they have conflicting implications for the non-coordinated outcomes. This is illustrated in Table
4 below, where the signs are switched relative to the preceding discussion to reflect the fact that
an increase in the relative money’s worth represents reduced rather than improved incentives
for early claiming.
Table 4: The effects on joint outcomes of reduced incentives for . . .
retirement claiming
Retire= 1 Retire= 0 Retire= 1 Retire= 0
Claim= 1 Claim= 1÷ + ÷ ÷
a b a b
Claim= 0
c d
Claim= 0
c d
÷ + + +
5.2.2 Empirical evidence
To allow for a straightforward operationalization of retirement from the labor force we restrict
attention to individuals registered as working full time at the end of 2010, and classify individu-
als as retired in 2011 if they have no active employment record at the end of the year. Column
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Table 5: Effects of RMW on early claiming and retirement outcomes
Dep.
Mean OLS 2SLSa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome
Claiming 33.8 -4.27∗∗∗ (0.13) -1.24∗∗∗ (0.36)
Retired 15.1 -0.80∗∗∗ (0.11) -0.67∗∗ (0.29)
Claiming and retired 7.5 -1.24∗∗∗ (0.07) -0.21 (0.21)
Claiming and not retired 26.3 -3.03∗∗∗ (0.12) -1.03∗∗∗ (0.36)
Retired and not claiming 7.6 0.45∗∗∗ (0.08) -0.45∗∗ (0.21)
Not retired and not claiming 58.6 3.82∗∗∗ (0.14) 1.69∗∗∗ (0.39)
N 18546
First stage F-statistic 1866.42
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p< 0.01.
The sample includes individuals eligible for early claiming, not receiving disability
pensions in 2010, and registered as full time employed at the end of 2010. Individuals
are classified as retired in 2011 if they have no active employment record at the end of
the year.
a The set of controls includes dummies for AFP affiliation (2010), sex, receipt of dis-
ability benefits prior to the age of 62, educational attainment (three categories), civil
status (four categories), dummies for the number of months on sickness leave at age
61, and dummies for net wealth and labor income quartiles (both measured in 2010).
Information on parental longevities is used to form instrumental variables in the 2SLS
estimations.
(1) of Table 5 summarizes the claiming and retirement behavior for this sample of 18,546 indi-
viduals, by listing the dependent means for the two combined outcomes claiming and retired,
and for each of the four joint claiming and retirement outcomes. We note that the restricted
sample is very close to the full estimation sample in terms of the fraction of early claimers
(33.8 vs 34.1 percent), and that 15 percent are classified as retired in 2011. The fact that as
many as 26 percent claim their NIS pensions without at the same time retiring from the labor
market is a clear indication that individuals are indeed making separate decisions of whether to
retire from the labor market and whether to start claiming pensions.19
Going further, we estimate equations (1)-(3) with each of the six claiming and retirement
outcomes on the left hand side of equations (1) and (3). In Column (2) of Table 5 we present
19The extent to which individuals in the “claiming and not retired” group are combining receipt of NIS pensions
with reductions in hours worked appears to be very limited. Average earnings in 2011 and 2010 are at the same
level, and only two percent (one half percent) have a reduction in earnings of more than 50 (20) percent from 2010
to 2011. Only seven percent are claiming less than a full pension.
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the simple linear regression estimates. A higher RMW decreases the probability of both joint
outcomes involving claiming, and increases the probability of retired and not claiming and not
retired and not claiming. Our main focus is on the 2SLS estimates in Column (4), where we
use only the variation in RMW that is generated by variation in parental longevities. We see
that higher values of RMW appear to be moving individuals to the not retired and not claim-
ing outcome from the three joint outcomes involving early claiming and/or retirement. RMW
having a negative effect on both non-coordinated outcomes means that one of the estimated
coefficients coincides with the predicted effect of reduced incentives for claiming (claiming
and not retired), while the other coincides with the predicted effect of reduced incentives for
retirement (retired and not claiming), cf. Table 4. Now, given that RMW is closely related to
expected longevity, with a correlation of 0.96, it is natural to think of the effect of RMW on
early retirement as an effect of expected longevity rather than an effect of claiming incentives
as such.20 Variation in expected longevity driven by parental longevities is likely to also be
correlated with health, and both high expected longevity and good health may keep individuals
from retiring early.
We show in Appendix Section A.1 that, under reasonable assumptions, the effect of RMW
on the joint outcome claiming and not retired can be interpreted as a lower bound for the
amount of selection that can be attributed to RMW affecting claiming decisions directly, and
not operating through a correlation between RMW (or expected longevity) and retirement de-
cisions.21 The point estimate for this lower bound is a statistically significant -1.00, which
suggests that at least 83% (1.03/1.24) of the effect of RMW on early claiming can be ex-
plained by the relative money’s worth influencing claiming behavior directly. The remaining
17% could be explained by either claiming or retirement behavior.
20Replacing RMW with expected longevity in the regressions makes very little impact on the results, besides
changing the scale of the point estimates.
21This test result still holds when it is taken into account that the effect of RMW on the joint outcome retired
and not claimingmust be positive for the estimate of the effect of RMW on the joint outcome claiming and retired
to be interpreted as a lower bound on the amount of selection in early claiming that can be attributed to RMW
affecting claiming decisions directly, as detailed in Appendix Section A.1.
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5.3 Threats to validity and robustness analysis
The preceding section established that expected longevity influencing retirement behavior has,
at most, only a moderate impact on the estimated association between the relative money’s
worth and claiming decisions. We now turn to a discussion of other potential threats to the ex-
clusion restriction, i.e. the assumption that effects of parental longevities on claiming decisions
are operating only through the relative money’s worth. We focus on heterogeneity in time pref-
erences and health conditions. These are traits that might be correlated with expected longevity,
and transmitted from parents to their children. We present descriptive evidence showing that
heterogeneity in time preferences is unlikely to be driving our results because our agents are
unlikely to be liquidity constrained, and we demonstrate that including/excluding controls for
net wealth and health conditions has very little impact on our parameter of interest. Finally, we
perform a placebo test using data on claiming behavior for an older cohort making claiming
and retirement decisions within the context of a pension system absent any mechanisms that
would generate incentives for active selection. We find no evidence of active selection for the
placebo cohort, suggesting that the active selection effects that we do find are indeed particular
to the cohorts facing differential incentives for claiming depending on expected longevity.
In a model without a credit market, individual time preference rates would be key com-
ponents of claiming behavior: Individuals with high discount rates could obtain a higher level
of current consumption by claiming pensions at the earliest possible age. If time preference
rates are passed on from parents to their children and access to credit is limited, a new link
is opened between parental longevities and claiming behavior. Individuals from families with
high discount rates are less likely to invest in future health, leading to worse health and shorter
lifespans, and they are more likely to claim their pensions early. The presence of a well-
functioning credit market breaks the link between heterogeneity in time preference rates and
claiming behavior. Individuals can use the credit market to adjust their consumption over time
to the desired levels and as a consequence the marginal rate of substitution between consump-
tion today and consumption tomorrow will be the same for all individuals and equal to the
market rate. Heterogeneity in intergenerationally transmittable time preference rates is there-
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics - Wealth of analysis cohort
Full cohort Eligible individuals
Mean Mean 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
Net Wealth 1,577,718 2,246,605 528,076 1,582,295 2,793,050
Housing wealth 984,000 1,488,000 0 1,487,598 2,311,340
Debt 492,840 728,448 9,205 311,744 971,238
Homeownership 0.591 0.740
N 59,291 22,564
fore not likely to pose a threat to the exclusion restriction if the subjects of our study have
access to credit at reasonable interest rates.
Table 6 describes the wealth holdings of our analysis cohort, in terms of net wealth and some
of its components. Column (1) reports means for the full cohort, while Columns (2)-(5) focus
on our estimation sample, consisting of individuals eligible for early claiming and not receiving
DI pensions in 2010. Average net wealth for individuals in our estimation sample amounts
to about 2.2 million Norwegian kroner (NOK), which at the time of writing corresponds to
about 250,000 US Dollars. Although the mean is influenced by a relatively small number
of very wealthy individuals, we note that even the first quartile of the distribution is above
NOK 500,000. Most of the individuals in our estimation sample are therefore likely to have
easy access to credit. Note that 74% of the estimation sample are homeowners. These are
particularly unlikely to be credit constrained, since they can typically refinance their mortgage
at low cost, using their home as collateral.22
Individual net wealth is highly relevant to the discussion above, both because myopic indi-
viduals are unlikely to have high net wealth and because individuals with high net wealth are
unlikely to be liquidity constrained. In the presence of heterogeneity in time preference rates
and liquidity constraints, our estimated coefficient of interest could have an omitted variable
bias if individuals with low relative money’s worth were more likely to have high discount
rates and be credit constrained. However, we would then expect the estimated coefficient of
22Most homes are worth far more than the associated mortgages - due to downpayments, and to substantial
increases in housing prices.
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interest to be sensitive to whether net wealth is included as part of the set of controls. Table 7
shows how the 2SLS estimate of the effect of RMW on the outcome Claiming and not retired
is not substantially altered by the inclusion/exclusion of dummies for net wealth quartiles. Fur-
ther, restricting the estimation sample to include homeowners only gives a point estimate very
similar to the one estimated on the full sample.
Expected longevity is very likely to be correlated with individual health, and health, in turn,
is likely to be partly determined by both genetic and social factors transmitted from parents to
their children. The perhaps most evident way in which health might affect claiming behavior
is through retirement decisions, together with claiming and retirement decisions being jointly
determined. We found above that expected longevity influencing retirement behavior has little
impact on the estimated association between the relative money’s worth and claiming decisions,
but we cannot a priori rule out any other mechanism through which health conditions might
have an influence on claiming decisions. However, if our estimated coefficient on the relative
money’s worth has an omitted variable bias because health is correlated with early claiming and
with the relative money’s worth, one would expect the coefficient to be sensitive to whether a
health proxy is included as part of the set of controls. Table 7 shows that including/excluding
dummies for the number of months on sickness leave at age 61 has very little impact on the
coefficient of interest.
Finally, we perform a placebo test of the relationship between expected longevity and early
claiming of pensions. This test is based on a simple comparison of claiming behavior under
two widely different pension regimes: the flexible pension system introduced in 2011, and
the much less flexible system that existed prior to 2011. In the old system, there were no
mechanisms that would generate incentives for active selection. The only way to claim pensions
prior to age 67 was through the old AFP early retirement program, a system with strict earnings
testing and without a deferral mechanism.23 Hence, there were no differences in the incentives
for early claiming generated by differences in expected longevities, besides those operating
on the retirement dimension. If we were to find an “active selection effect” also in the old
23See e.g. Vestad (2013) for details.
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Table 7: Effects of RMW on Claiming and not retired - robustness
Claiming and not retired 2SLS
All covariates included -1.029*** (0.356)
Controls for sickness leave excluded -1.000*** (0.356)
Controls for financial wealth excluded -1.190*** (0.358)
Both sickness leave and wealth excluded -1.163*** (0.358)
Homeowners only (n=16,688) -1.039*** (0.383)
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01.
The sample includes individuals eligible for early claiming, not receiving
disability pensions in 2010, and registered as full time employed at the
end of 2010. Individuals are classified as retired in 2011 if they have no
active employment record at the end of the year.
The full set of controls includes dummies for AFP affiliation (2010), sex,
receipt of disability benefits prior to the age of 62, educational attainment
(three categories), civil status (four categories), dummies for the number
of months on sickness leave at age 61, and dummies for net wealth and
labor income quartiles (both measured in 2010). Information on parental
longevities is used to form instrumental variables in the 2SLS estimations.
system, this would necessarily be generated by other mechanisms than a direct link between
expected longevity and early claiming, which would not reflect well on the credibility of our
main analysis.
We perform our placebo analysis on the claiming behavior of the 1945 cohort in 2007,
chosen to be reasonably close in time to our main analysis, but with some spacing to minimize
issues with behavior in the anticipation of the new pension system. To make sure that we can
run comparable analyses for the 1949 and 1945 cohorts, we make some minor adjustments
to our baseline framework. First, we use expected longevity rather than the relative money’s
worth as the regressor of interest. This change has very little impact on the results for the
1949 cohort, given the close to perfect correlation between expected longevity and the relative
money’s worth. Second, we restrict attention to workers in AFP affiliated firms for both cohorts,
i.e. to the groups of workers at risk for early claiming under both the old and the new pension
regimes. Third, we require eligibility for early claiming according to the rules in the new
pension system also for the 1945 cohort, to make the sample selection resemble the one we use
for the 1949 cohort. And fourth, we exclude net wealth from the set of controls, as it is very
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Table 8: Effects of expected longevity on early claiming for the 1945 and 1949 cohorts
Dep.
N Mean OLS 2SLSa
Sample
1949 cohort 15521 33.2 -0.0497∗∗∗ (0.0016) -0.0134∗∗∗ (0.0039)
1945 cohort 12610 27.8 -0.0094∗∗∗ (0.0021) 0.0013 (0.0041)
First stage F-statistics:
1949 cohort 3108.33
1945 cohort 2786.06
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p< 0.01.
The two samples include workers in public and private sector firms affiliated with AFP,
eligible for early claiming, and not receiving disability pensions in 2010/2006.
a The set of controls includes dummies for public sector (2010/2006), sex, receipt of dis-
ability benefits prior to the age of 62, educational attainment (three categories), civil status
(four categories), and dummies for labor income quartiles (measured in 2010/2006). In-
formation on parental longevities is used to form instrumental variables in the 2SLS es-
timations.
hard to construct comparable measures of net wealth for the two years.24
OLS and 2SLS estimates for each of the two cohorts are presented in Table 8. The results
for the 1949 cohort are well in line with the baseline results presented in Section 5.1: In terms
of total selection, a one year increase in expected longevity is associated with a 5.0 percentage
points decrease in early claiming, while magnitude of the 2SLS coefficient amounts to 27%
of the total selection estimate. As for the 1945 cohort, we estimate a much lower amount
of total selection than for the 1949 cohort, with a one year increase in expected longevity
being associated with a 0.9 percentage points decrease in early claiming. Note that statistically
significant total selection for the 1945 cohort is not at odds with the theory: In the old system,
early claiming was in practice the same as early retirement, and hence a correlation between
early claiming and expected longevity comes as no big surprise. The 2SLS coefficient, however,
is small and statistically insignificant. This supports our interpretation of the active selection
effect that we do find for the 1949 cohort as one being particular to the cohort facing the flexible
pension system with incentives for active selection.
24This difficulty arises from a highly unsystematic relationship between tax assessments and market values of
real estate for years prior to 2010.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the extent to which early claiming of public pensions is associ-
ated with expected gains from early claiming in the context of a public pension system with
flexible claiming age. We have made use of a mortality model with a wide range of background
characteristics for the entire Norwegian population to estimate individual expected longevity
at age 62. We have further operationalized a measure of the incentives for early claiming, the
relative money’s worth, defined as the ratio of the expected present value of pension benefits
associated with claiming at age 67 to the expected present value of pension benefits associated
with claiming at age 62.
By using parental longevities as instruments for expected longevity in a 2SLS framework,
we have distinguished between two types of selection: (i) active selection, represented by indi-
viduals claiming early in part because they expect to gain from doing so in terms of the expected
present value of pension benefits, and (ii) passive selection, resulting from other mechanisms
generating a correlation between expected gains from claiming and actual claiming, such as co-
ordinated timing of retirement and claiming and a negative correlation between retirement age
and longevity. In terms of the overall selection, our results indicate that a one percent increase
in the gains from postponing claiming from age 62 to 67 is associated with a 4 percentage
points (12 percent) reduction in claiming at age 62. Although the observed selection in early
claiming amounts to as much as one third of the full potential, given our measure of expected
longevity, the costs to public funds are rather moderate: Selection in early claiming increases
the public cost of pensions for early claimers by a modest 0.8 percent.
In terms of active selection, or the extent to which individuals claim pensions early in part
because they act on information about their expected longevity, we find that a one percent
increase in the relative money’s worth reduces claiming at age 62 by at least one percentage
point (three percent). In our view, the finding that active selection is present in this context is of
inherent interest, as it should not be taken for granted that agents act on complicated incentives
in public benefit schemes. Our analysis suggests that allowing for more flexibility in pension
systems, for instance by removing earnings testing, is likely to lead to adverse selection in
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early claiming; some individuals will claim pensions early to take advantage of the associated
increase in social security wealth. Our results also suggest, however, that the resulting increase
in the costs to public budgets will be rather moderate. Hence, adverse selection should not
be considered a major disadvantage of flexible systems when considering the design of public
pension systems.
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A Appendix
This appendix consists of three parts. Section A.1 presents a simple model of the joint decisions
of claiming and retirement. Section A.2 presents a short numerical illustration of the costs of
early claiming to public finances to demonstrate that these costs can be expected to be modest.
Section A.3 provides supplementary tables.
A.1 A simple model of claiming and retirement
In this section we present a simple model of claiming and retirement. This model serves three
purposes: First, it highlights the simultaneous nature of the claiming and the retirement de-
cisions. Second, it shows how some factors might affect the claiming decision without affect-
ing the retirement decision, and vise versa. Third, it delivers predictions for retirement and
claiming outcomes that can be used to rule out the possibility that the relationship between
financial incentives and claiming behavior that we observe in the data is entirely driven by the
retirement decision.
We model the decisions of an agent facing two periods: a first period involving early retire-
ment and claiming decisions, followed by an old age retirement period. Our agent starts out
with initial wealthW . He makes a dichotomous decision of whether to retire early, R ∈ {0,1},
earning (1−R) from work in period 1, and a separate decision of whether to claim pensions
early, C ∈ {0,1}. The pension system is modelled as follows: If C = 1, the agent receives
ω1 in period 1 and ω2 in period 2. If pensions are deferred, the individual receives ω2+ τω1
in the second period, where τ is an actuarial adjustment factor. Besides through the pension
system, the agent can transfer money between the two periods by saving, which pays a market
interest rate r. A binary random variable ξ takes the value 1 if the agent is alive in period
2, and 0 otherwise, and p denotes the survival probability. The agent only receives pensions
if alive, while any remaining wealth is bequeathed upon death. The pension system offers a
compensation for the mortality risk, which means that τ > (1+ r). In the following, we will
write τ = (1+ r)/q and interpret q as the survival probability that is implicit in the actuarial
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adjustment in the pension system.
Individuals are assumed to maximize expected lifetime utility, based on the utility function
U = u(X1,R)+δ (X2+b), (A1)
where X1 and X2 represent first and second period consumption, respectively, b denotes be-
quests, δ is the individual discount factor, and u(·) is strictly increasing and concave in X1
and strictly increasing in R. To abstract from the insurance motive in annuity demand and
from bequest motives, we specify second period utility simply as the sum of own consumption
and bequests. Each agent’s problem amounts to choosing first period consumption, to decide
whether to retire or not and whether to claim pensions or not in period 1, so as to maximize
lifetime utility. Private transfers S from period 1 to period 2 can be expressed as follows:
S=W +(1−R)+Cω1−X1. (A2)
No choices of substance are made in the second period; the individuals who die after period 1
simply bequeath their wealth, while those who survive will choose any combination (X2,b) of
own consumption and bequests from their wealth and pensions, such that
X2+b= (1+ r)S+ξ (ω2+(1−C)τω1) . (A3)
Combining (A2) and (A3), inserting for X2+b into equation (A1) and taking expectations (over
survival) leaves us with
E(U) = u(X1,R)+δ ((1+ r)(W +(1−R)+Cω1−X1)+ p(ω2+(1−C)τω1)) , (A4)
which can be rearranged so as to highlight the decoupling of the retirement and claiming de-
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cisions:
E(U) = u(X1,R)+δ (1+ r)(W +(1−R)−X1)
+δ [pω2+ω1(C(1+ r)+ p(1−C)τ)] . (A5)
In a perfectly decoupled retirement/claiming system, and in the absence of capital market
imperfections, the choice ofC and R is best studied by examining
UR,C =max
X1
E(U |R,C), (A6)
i.e. by comparing the utilities in the four possible combinations of R and C, given the optimal
choice of first period consumption. It is clear from equation (A5) that one may write UR,C =
UrR+UcC, where
UrR =maxX1
{u(X1,R)+δ (1+ r)(W +(1−R)−X1)} (A7)
and
UcC = δ pω2+δ (1+ r)ω1
[
C+
p
q
(1−C)
]
, (A8)
where we have used that τ = (1+ r)/q.
Postponing claiming, choosingC = 0, can be thought of as buying an annuity. The price of
the annuity in this system is ω1, the foregone period 1 pension benefits, while the present value
of the increase in second period pensions is ξτω1/(1+ r). The moneys’ worth of the implicit
Social Security annuity is then
MW =
E
( 1
1+rξτω1
)
ω1
=
p
q
, (A9)
i.e. the ratio of the subjective survival probability to the survival probability in the pension
system. From equation (A8) it follows directly that the agent will choose to claim pensions
early (C = 1) if and only if p/q < 1, i.e. if the money’s worth of the implicit annuity is less
than one. Importantly, the money’s worth does not affect the retirement decision, as it only
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appears in the expression for UcC. We can use this property to define a perfectly decoupled
retirement/claiming system in a more general manner: In such a system, a change in the factors
affecting claiming will not affect retirement, and a change in the factors affecting retirement
will not affect claiming.
We will now discuss the implications of introducing different imperfections to the system.
Define a retirement/claiming system as a coupled system if taxes, benefits, regulations or credit
markets lead to reduced utility or infeasibility of the non-coordinated combinations of claiming
and retirement. More formally, define a coupled system as one in which UR,C ≥ UrR+UcC if
C=R, and whereUR,C ≤UrR+UcC ifC =R. Unlike in the model above, some penalty may apply
for not coordinating claiming and retirement behavior, or some bonus may apply if decisions
are coordinated.
One example of a coupled system is the current US system for individuals below the normal
retirement age. Since their pension benefits are earnings tested, choosing C = 1 and R = 0 is
simply not feasible, which is equivalent to assigning U0,1 a sufficiently low value. Another
example of a coupled system is a system that is notionally decoupled, but not accompanied by
a perfect capital market. Assume that an agent faces liquidity constraints, in the sense that any
borrowing must be at an interest rate higher than the market rate r. With sensible parameters
in the model above, the only reason our agent would want to borrow would be to finance early
retirement without claiming pensions; R = 1, C = 0. In this example, U1,0 will be lower than
in a perfectly decoupled system, since some resources are lost through a higher interest rate. A
third example of a coupled system is a system that is decoupled at the gross pension level, but
not at the net pension level, due to progressive taxation. This applies to the Norwegian system.
Progressive taxation discriminates slightly against not coordinating claiming and retirement, as
coordination of claiming and retirement decisions amounts to income smoothing and therefore
leads to higher net income.
In the following, we will say that a change in parameters improves the incentives for early
claiming if Uc1 increases relative to U
c
0 . We will say that a change in parameters improves the
incentives to retire ifUr1 increases relative toUr0. In a perfectly decoupled system, a change in
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parameters that improves the incentives for early claiming may induce agents to claim while
leaving their retirement decision unaffected, unless the same parameters also affect the in-
centives to retire. In a coupled system, on the other hand, improving the incentives for early
claiming may induce individuals to claim and to retire, and improving the incentives to retire
may lead individuals to both retire and claim pensions. However, an improvement in the in-
centives for early claiming and an improvement in the incentives to retire will have different
implications in terms of changes in the joint outcomes of retirement and early claiming, which
can be summarized as follows: In a coupled system, an improvement in the incentives for early
claiming may lead individuals
1. from choosing R= 0,C = 0 to choosing R= 0, C = 1,
2. from choosing R= 1,C = 0 to choosing R= 1, C = 1, and
3. from choosing R= 0,C = 0 to choosing R= 1, C = 1.
An improvement in the incentives to retire may lead individuals
1. from choosing R= 0,C = 0 to choosing R= 1, C = 0,
2. from choosing R= 0,C = 1 to choosing R= 1, C = 1, and
3. from choosing R= 0,C = 0 to choosing R= 1, C = 1.
That is, while improvements in the incentives for early claiming and improvements in the in-
centives to retire will have the same implications in terms of effects on coordinated outcomes,
they have conflicting implications for the non-coordinated outcomes.
Let πc be a continuous variable measuring the incentives for early claiming, and πr be
a continuous variable measuring the incentives to retire. Think about these variables as im-
perfect predictors of claiming and retirement, and let the probability of each of the possible
combinations of retirement and claiming be continuously differentiable functions of πc and πr.
Let π be some variable potentially affecting πc and πr, e.g. the relative money’s worth, and
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assume that πc and πr are both continuously differentiable functions of π . We now have
∂P(R= a∩C = b)
∂π =
∂P(R= a∩C = b)
∂πc
∂πc
∂π +
∂P(R= a∩C = b)
∂πr
∂πr
∂π (A10)
for a,b ∈ {0,1}. The signs of the partial derivatives with respect to πc and πr follow from
the list above and are illustrated in Table 4 (in which the signs are switched relative to the
preceding discussion to reflect the fact that an increase in the relative money’s worth repres-
ents reduced rather than improved incentives for early claiming). Under assumptions about
the signs of ∂πr/∂π and ∂πc/∂π , it is possible to bound the two objects (∂P(R = 0∩C =
1)/∂πc)(∂πc/∂π) and (∂P(C = 1)/∂πc)(∂πc/∂π).
Assume that ∂πc/∂π < 0 and ∂πr/∂π < 0, i.e. an increase in the relative money’s worth/expected
longevity lowers the incentives for early claiming/retirement. These assumptions, along with
the theoretical predictions for the effects of improvements in the incentives for early claim-
ing/retirement, gives us that
∂P(R= 0∩C = 1)
∂πr
∂πr
∂π ≥ 0. (A11)
From equation (A10), with R= 0 and C = 1, it now follows that
∂P(R= 0∩C = 1)
∂π ≥
∂P(R= 0∩C = 1)
∂πc
∂πc
∂π . (A12)
The estimated effect ∂P(R = 0∩C = 1)/∂π is also an estimated lower bound on the full
magnitude of the direct effect of increased incentives for early claiming, as
∂P(C = 1)
∂πc
=
∂P(R= 0∩C = 1)
∂πc
+
∂P(R= 1∩C = 1)
∂πc
(A13)
together with equation (A12) implies
∂P(R= 0∩C = 1)
∂π ≥
∂P(R= 0∩C = 1)
∂πc
∂πc
∂π ≥
∂P(C = 1)
∂πc
∂πc
∂π . (A14)
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Thus, the effect of RMW on P(R= 0∩C = 1) in Table 5 can be interpreted as an upper bound
(or a lower bound on the magnitude) for the effect of RMW on early claiming that is operating
through claiming decisions, and not mediated by retirement decisions. For valid statistical
inference, it is necessary to take into account the uncertainty in the sign assumptions used for
deriving the bounds. A simple approach is to state that we have a significant upper bound
to the effects in equation (A14) as long as ∂P(R = 0∩C = 1)/∂π < 0 and ∂P(R = 1∩C =
0)/∂π < 0.25 Using the Bonferroni method (see e.g. Romano et al., 2010), we can compute
(an upper bound to) the p-value for such a joint test as twice the maximum p-value of the two
components’ tests.
25If π is a variable that affects claiming negatively, but retirement positively, the bound derived here is not valid,
because a lower π leads to a higher P(R = 0∩C = 1) through both the claiming and the retirement mechanism.
The bound is based on the notion that a lower π leads to a higher P(R = 0∩C = 1) only through the claiming
mechanism, as the retirement mechanism works in the opposite direction.
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A.2 A note on the costs of selection in pension claiming to public funds
The combination of significant selection in early claiming and very moderate costs to public
funds may appear as a somewhat puzzling result. It is not a consequence of particularly high
discount rates, nor does it relate to insufficient variation in expected longevity in our sample
(see Section 3.3) - it simply follows from the fact that the gain from strategically choosing the
time of claiming is rather modest.
A brief numerical example elucidates this mechanism. Consider a pension system that
pays a benefit stream whose present value is independent of the age at which pension claim-
ing begins, for an individual with average expected longevity. For simplicity, assume that an
individual can claim at age 62 or age 67, and that the system is calibrated to a longevity of 25
years at age 62, so that claiming at age 62 leads to a 20 percent reduction in annual benefits
compared to claiming at age 67.
An individual expecting to live another 24 years at age 62 might choose to claim early to
capture the gains. By claiming at age 62 he will receive 24 years of pensions at 80 percent of
the ordinary rate, compared to 19 years at the full rate. The full gain from claiming 5 years
earlier is then only about 1.0 percent ((24∗0.8−19)/19).
The effect of expected longevity on the relative money’s worth is slightly non-linear, but an
individual with a life expectancy of 20 years at age 62 would by similar calculations gain 6.7
percent from claiming early (i.e. (20∗0.8−15)/15).
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A.3 Additional tables
Table A1: Summary statistics; estimation sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Expected longevity 86.4607 2.1525 76.163 92.587
Relative money’s worth 1.0002 0.0254 0.8499 1.1970
Income in 2010 (in 100000 NOK) 4.6653 2.9927 0 109.8312
Net wealth in 2010 (in 100000 NOK) 22.4660 58.3468 -328.2402 3037.14
Male 0.7557 0.4297 0 1
Birth month 5.8537 3.0650 1 11
Number of children 2.0745 1.1340 0 13
Civil status
Married/cohabiting, at least one child 0.6940 0.4608 0 1
Married, no children 0.0366 0.1878 0 1
Single, at least one child 0.0044 0.0664 0 1
Single/cohabiting, no children 0.2650 0.4413 0 1
Receipt of disability benefits
Never received 0.9953 0.0687 0 1
Received prior to age 62 0.0047 0.0687 0 1
Educational attainment
Primary/missing 0.3586 0.4796 0 1
High school 0.3393 0.4735 0 1
Higher education/in education 0.3021 0.4592 0 1
Parents’ longevity
Mother unknown 0.0349 0.1835 0 1
Mother emigrated 0.0009 0.0298 0 1
Father unknown 0.0632 0.2434 0 1
Father emigrated 0.0005 0.0231 0 1
Mother dead before age 50 0.0114 0.1061 0 1
Mother’s (expected) longevity1 83.2278 10.8111 50 104.26
max(Mother’s (expected) longevity−65,0) 18.1058 9.9837 0 39.2600
Father dead before age 50 0.0180 0.1329 0 1
Father’s (expected) longevity1 77.3338 11.2622 50 105.22
max(Father’s (expected) longevity−65,0) 9.7956 10.3062 0 40.22
N 22,564
1 For the subsample of individuals whose mothers/fathers are not unknown, not emigrated, and did not die
prior to age 50.
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Table A2: Summary statistics; 1949 cohort
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Expected longevity 85.7478 3.3141 73.2400 92.718
Male 0.5072 0.5 0 1
Birth month 5.8533 3.0697 1 11
Number of children 2.1011 1.1994 0 14
Civil status
Married/cohabiting, at least one child 0.6383 0.4805 0 1
Married, no children 0.0353 0.1846 0 1
Single, at least one child 0.0067 0.0817 0 1
Single/cohabiting, no children 0.3197 0.4664 0 1
Receipt of disability benefits
Never received 0.6810 0.4661 0 1
Received in 1967 0.0118 0.1078 0 1
Received before age 50 0.1306 0.3370 0 1
Received between age 50 and 61 0.1766 0.3813 0 1
Educational attainment
Primary/missing 0.5045 0.5000 0 1
High school 0.2991 0.4579 0 1
Higher education/in education 0.1964 0.3973 0 1
Parents’ longevity
Mother unknown 0.0812 0.2731 0 1
Mother emigrated 0.0008 0.0281 0 1
Father unknown 0.1115 0.3148 0 1
Father emigrated 0.0004 0.0199 0 1
Mother dead before age 50 0.0121 0.1093 0 1
Mother’s (expected) longevity1 82.6692 10.9513 50 106.26
max(Mother’s (expected) longevity−65,0) 16.7667 10.4782 0 41.26
Father dead before age 50 0.0186 0.1351 0 1
Father’s (expected) longevity1 76.6768 11.3217 50 105.22
max(Father’s (expected) longevity−65,0) 8.9540 10.0581 0 40.22
N 52,991
1 For the subsample of individuals whose mothers/fathers are not unknown, not emigrated, and did
not die prior to age 50.
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Table A3: Summary statistics for longevity estimation
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Male 0.49 0.50 0 1
Age 47.29 18.78 17 94
Above age 56 0.33 0.47 0 1
Year 2006.59 2.88 2002 2011
No. of children 1.6 1.42 0 18
Survive 0.99 0.1 0 1
Receipt of disability benefits
Never received 0.8595686 0.3474341 0 1
Received in 1967 0.0018619 0.0431091 0 1
Received before age 50 0.0529078 0.2238494 0 1
Received between age 50 and 61 0.0589444 0.2355206 0 1
Received after age 62 0.0267174 0.1612562 0 1
Educational attainment
Primary/missing 0.4094713 0.4917363 0 1
High school 0.2873144 0.4525095 0 1
Higher education/in education 0.3032143 0.459647 0 1
Civil status
Married/cohabiting, at least one child 0.4876253 0.4998468 0 1
Married, no children 0.0372666 0.1894144 0 1
Single, at least one child 0.1929423 0.3946081 0 1
Single/cohabiting, no children 0.2821658 0.4500536 0 1
County
Østfold 0.0565932 0.2310636 0 1
Akershus (Asker and Bærum) 0.0327908 0.1780886 0 1
Akershus (excl. Asker and Bærum) 0.0732115 0.2604833 0 1
Oslo West 0.0276363 0.1639284 0 1
Oslo (excl. Oslo West) 0.0925232 0.2897632 0 1
Hedmark 0.0413802 0.199168 0 1
Oppland 0.0400961 0.1961847 0 1
Buskerud 0.0534495 0.2249281 0 1
Vestfold 0.0481229 0.2140259 0 1
Telemark 0.0361931 0.1867704 0 1
Aust-Agder 0.0224486 0.1481373 0 1
Vest-Agder 0.0344703 0.1824338 0 1
Rogaland 0.0836963 0.2769318 0 1
Hordaland 0.0965672 0.2953675 0 1
Sogn og Fjordane 0.0225099 0.1483347 0 1
Møre og Romsdal 0.0525532 0.2231397 0 1
Sør-Trøndelag 0.0594736 0.2365089 0 1
Nord-Trøndelag 0.0274072 0.1632669 0 1
Nordland 0.0506338 0.2192488 0 1
Troms 0.0328167 0.1781567 0 1
Finnmark 0.0154264 0.1232414 0 1
N 36897516
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Table A4: Summary statistics; individuals of age 56 and older
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Survive 0.971 0.169 0 1 12230460
Mother unknown 0.453 0.498 0 1 12230460
Mother emigrated 0.001 0.024 0 1 12230460
Father unknown 0.484 0.500 0 1 12230460
Father emigrated 0.001 0.026 0 1 12230460
For sub-sample with known parents:
Mother dead before age 50 0.009 0.094 0 1 6680768
Father dead before age 50 0.013 0.113 0 1 6296877
For sub-sample with parents living past age 50:
Mother’s (expected) longevity 82.97 9.92 51 111 6621289
Father’s (expected) longevity 77.83 10.24 51 111 6214686
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Table A5: Longevity regression; 1949 cohort
Dependent variable: Expected longevity
Male -4.00∗∗∗ (0.01)
Educational attainment (ref: higher education)
Primary/missing -1.63∗∗∗ (0.01)
High school -0.81∗∗∗ (0.01)
Receipt of disability benefits (ref: never received)
Received in 1967 -7.70∗∗∗ (0.04)
Received before age 50 -5.21∗∗∗ (0.01)
Received between age 50 and 61 -2.99∗∗∗ (0.01)
Civil status (ref: married/cohabiting, at least one child)
Married, no children -1.05∗∗∗ (0.02)
Single, at least one child -1.33∗∗∗ (0.05)
Single/cohabiting, no children -1.39∗∗∗ (0.01)
County (ref: Østfold)
Akershus (Asker and Bærum) 0.53∗∗∗ (0.03)
Akershus (excl. Asker and Bærum) -0.01 (0.02)
Oslo West 0.36∗∗∗ (0.03)
Oslo (excl. Oslo West) -0.24∗∗∗ (0.02)
Hedmark -0.01 (0.02)
Oppland 0.00 (0.02)
Buskerud 0.07∗∗∗ (0.02)
Vestfold 0.18∗∗∗ (0.02)
Telemark 0.12∗∗∗ (0.03)
Aust-Agder -0.02 (0.03)
Vest-Agder 0.27∗∗∗ (0.03)
Rogaland 0.31∗∗∗ (0.02)
Hordaland 0.56∗∗∗ (0.02)
Sogn og Fjordane 0.72∗∗∗ (0.03)
Møre og Romsdal 0.79∗∗∗ (0.02)
Sør-Trøndelag 0.29∗∗∗ (0.02)
Nord-Trøndelag 0.45∗∗∗ (0.03)
Nordland 0.57∗∗∗ (0.02)
Troms 0.45∗∗∗ (0.03)
Finnmark -0.16∗∗∗ (0.03)
Parents’ longevity
Mother unknown -1.08∗∗∗ (0.17)
Mother emigrated -0.61∗∗∗ (0.22)
Father unknown 0.03 (0.12)
Father emigrated 0.93∗∗∗ (0.24)
Mother dead before age 50 -0.83∗∗∗ (0.05)
Mother’s (expected) longevity -0.04∗∗∗ (0.00)
max(Mother’s (expected) longevity−65,0) 0.11∗∗∗ (0.00)
Father dead before age 50 0.02 (0.04)
Father’s (expected) longevity -0.01∗∗∗ (0.00)
max(Father’s (expected) longevity−65,0) 0.08∗∗∗ (0.00)
R2 0.917
N 52,991
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Table A6: The composition of workers in different sectors
Private Public
with AFP no AFP
Men 0.83 0.84 0.58
Educational attainment
Primary/missing 0.45 0.42 0.18
High school 0.37 0.34 0.32
Higher education 0.18 0.24 0.50
Sample: Individuals eligible for pension take-up, not re-
ceiving disability pensions in 2010 and with registered la-
bour income above 1BA in 2010.
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Table A7: First stage regression; full estimation sample
Dependent variable: Relative money’s worth
Parents’ longevity
Mother unknown -0.0045∗ (0.0025)
Mother emigrated -0.0012 (0.0027)
Father unknown -0.0037∗∗ (0.0018)
Father emigrated 0.0043 (0.0026)
Mother dead before age 50 -0.0063 ∗∗∗ (0.0008)
Mother’s (expected) longevity -0.0003 ∗∗∗ (0.0000)
max(Mother’s (expected) longevity− 65,0) 0.0010 ∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Father dead before age 50 -0.0009 (0.0006)
Father’s (expected) longevity -0.0002∗∗∗ (0.0000)
max(Father’s (expected) longevity− 65,0) 0.0008 ∗∗∗ (0.0000)
Male -0.0441∗∗∗ (0.0002)
Educational attainment (ref: higher education)
Primary/missing -0.0146∗∗∗ (0.0002)
High school -0.0076∗∗∗ (0.0001)
Receipt of disability benefits (ref: never received)
Received prior to age 62 -0.0582∗∗∗ (0.0023)
Civil status (ref: married/cohabiting, at least one child)
Married, no children -0.0080∗∗∗ (0.0003)
Single, at least one child -0.0184∗∗∗ (0.0006)
Single/cohabiting, no children -0.0166∗∗∗ (0.0002)
Working in public sector 0.0009∗∗∗ (0.0002)
Working in private sector with AFP -0.0031∗∗∗ (0.0002)
Labor income quartiles and employment status (ref: first quartile)
Q2 0.0001 (0.0002)
Q3 -0.0002 (0.0002)
Q4 -0.0000 (0.0002)
Self employed and other -0.0007∗∗ (0.0003)
Not working -0.0006 (0.0008)
Net wealth quartiles (ref: first quartile)
Q2 -0.0004∗∗ (0.0002)
Q3 -0.0007∗∗∗ (0.0002)
Q4 -0.0005∗∗∗ (0.0002)
Number of months on sickness leave at 61 (ref: zero)
One 0.0005 (0.0004)
Two -0.0001 (0.0003)
Three 0.0006∗ (0.0003)
Four 0.0000 (0.0004)
Five -0.0006 (0.0005)
Six -0.0001 (0.0006)
Seven -0.0008 (0.0007)
Eight -0.0000 (0.0007)
Nine 0.0015∗ (0.0008)
Ten -0.0014∗ (0.0008)
Eleven 0.0003 (0.0008)
Twelve 0.0002 (0.0009)
Constant 1.0920∗∗∗ (0.0030)
R2 0.88
First stage F-statistic 2204.91
N 22,564
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p <
0.01. Sample: Individuals eligible for pension take-up and not receiving disability pensions
in 2010.
xv
Statistics Norway
Postal address:
PO Box 8131 Dept
NO-0033 Oslo
Ofﬁ ce address:
Akersveien 26, Oslo
Oterveien 23, Kongsvinger
E-mail: ssb@ssb.no
Internet: www.ssb.no
Telephone: + 47 62 88 50 00
ISSN: 1892-753X
D
esig
n
: Siri B
o
q
u
ist
